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BILLS AND NoTrs - CONSIDERATION - NoTE Grvnr BANK TO DEcEv BANK
EXAMINER.-A note given by the defendant to a bank was discharged by the
defendant's bankruptcy. Later the defendant gave a new note, solely in order
that it might be shown to the bank examiner as one of the bank's assets. The
receiver of the bank brought suit to recover on the note. Held, that the
receiver could recover. Niblack v. Farley (1919, Ill.) 122 N. E. 16o.
There can be no question as to the soundness of the decision. No recovery,
indeed, can be had by the payee on a note given without consideration. So
with a director of a bank giving his own note to replace among the assets the
worthless note of another. First Natl. Bk. v. Felt (1896) Ioo Ia. 68o, 69 N. W.
io57. And in general a defence good against the bank is good against its
receiver. Steelman v. Atchley (1911) 98 Ark. 294, 135 S. W. 902. But where
the note was given to puff the bank's apparent assets and so defraud the
examiner and the public, courts properly refuse to allow the lack of considera-
tion to be set up against the receiver. Lyons v. Benney (1911) 23o Pa. 117,
79 AtI. 25o. There has been some disposition to limit this rule to cases where
payment of the obligation is necessary to satisfy creditors. Lyons v. West-
water (igog, W. D. Pa.) 173 Fed. III (but there the promise not to enforce
was in writing). But where the maker of the obligation was interested in the
bank, the New York courts have leen very ready to find actual consideration
to him, through the benefit to the bank. Hurd v. Kelly (1879) 78 N. Y. 588;
Union Bank v. Sullivan (1915) 214 N. Y. 332, io8 N. E. 558. This would not
apply to the maker in the instant case, who was in no way connected with the
bank. But a prior debt discharged by bankruptcy is consideration for a new
promise to pay. The new promise is, to be sure, binding only according to its
own terms. Gillingham v. Brown (igoi) 178 Mass. 417, 6o N. E. 122. And
here one of the terms was, that it was not to be enforced. But the "promise"
having been put into the form of a note, the parol evidence rule comes into
play. It has been very generally held that such additional terms as would
defeat any purpose in making the instrument, may not be shown. See 4 Wig-
more, Evidence, sec. 2443; cf. 5 Chamberlain, Evidence, sec. 3553. So generally
with a promise to renew at the maker's option. Hall v. First Natl. Bk. (1899)
173 Mass. 16, 53 N. E. 154; New London Credit Syndicate v. Neale (C. A.)
[1898] 2 Q. B. 487. And so concededly with a promise never to sue on the
note. Davis v. Randall (1874) 115 Mass. 547; First Natl. Bk. v. Foote (1895)
12 Utah, 157, 42 Pac. 2o5; Western Carolina Bank v..Moore (9o5) 138 N. C.
529, 51 S. E. 79; Bailey v. Lankford (1916) 54 Okla. 692, 154 Pac. 674. It is
believed therefore, that in the instant case the defendant would have been held
on his note even as against the bank. And it is believed that the interests of
the bank's innocent creditors and stockholders would suffice to bar the defense
of in pari delicto. Cf. (igg) YALE LAW JOURNAL, 699; but see First Natl. Bk.
v. Felt, supra, at p. 685. And the defense that the note was signed as a mere
sham might very properly be excluded, on the ground that recognizing such a
sham as this would be contrary to morals and sound policy. See Grand Isle v.
Kinney (1898) 70 Vt 381, 41 Atl. 130; 4 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 24o6 and nn.
6, 7; but cf. cases 5 ibid. 608.
CONFLICT OF LAwS-JURISDIcTION FOR DIVORcE-DomICiL IN COUNTRY GRANTING
ExTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS.-The appellant, a British subject, made his permanent
home in Egypt with the intention of residing there for an unlimited time, and
[323]
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enjoyed extraterritorial rights. The respondent, his wife, petitioned for a
divorce in England. Held, that as a matter of law it was not impossible for a
British subject in this position to acquire an Egyptian domicil, that in fact the
appellant had acquired such a domicil and that there was no jurisdiction in the
English court to dissolve the marriage of the appellant with the respondent.
Casdagli v. Casdagli (igig, H. L.) 12o L. T. Rep. 52.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 81o.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PRocss-FoaraTuRE.-A Georgia statute provided
that all vehicles used to transport liquor, the sale or possession of which is
prohibited by law, should be "seized, condemned and sold." An action was
instituted to condemn the plaintiff's automobile, and claim was made that the
statute was in violation of the "due process" clause of the federal constitution.
Held, that the statute was valid. Mack v. Westbrook (I919, Ga.) 98 S. E. 339.
It is well settled that a state has the power to prohibit or restrict the manu-
facture, sale or possession of liquor. Mugler v. Kansas (1887, 123 U. S. 623,
8 Sup. Ct. 273. The state may, within the discretion of the legislature, adopt
such measures as are reasonably necessary to make the power effective. Crane
v. Campbell (1917) 245 U. S. 304, 38 Sup. Ct. 98 (prohibiting the possession of
intoxicating liquors for personal use) ; Kidd v. Pearson (1888) 125 U. S. 1, 9
Sup. Ct 6. Forfeiture of property on account of the misconduct of those in
possession, treating the thing as the instrument of the offense-is within the
principles of our legislation. Smith v. Maryland (I855, U. S.) 18 How. 71. It has
proven a very satisfactory means of combating evils. See Calif. Red Light
Abatement Laws, St. 1913, 20, 21 (house of assignation); Minn. St. 1913, ch.
562 (disorderly houses); Neb. Rev. St 1913, secs. 8775-8792; Conn. Gen. St
1918, sec. 3138 (boats used to catch fish in violation of the law); N. Y. Laws
19o8, 1O41, ch. 350, sec. 31c (containers of liquor) Consequently such statutes
have been repeatedly upheld. People v. Barbiere (1917, Calif.) 166 Pac. 812;
Wilcox v. Ryder (1914) 126 Minn. 95, 147 N. W. 953. But it seems that strict
compliance with such a statute is requisite to its valid enforcement Philipps v.
Stapleton (1919, Ga.) 97 S. E. 885. As applied to the liquor traffic their value is
obvious. Where the property was in the possession of a third person, however,
there are some difficulties of application. The cases are not in complete accord
as to whether knowledge is to be "imputed" to the innocent owner: i. e., as to
whether his actual knowledge is immaterial. People v. Casa Co. (1918, Calif.)
169 Pac. 454 (knowledge of lessee "imputed"); Clement v. Robach (19o9, Sup.
Ct.) 115 N. Y. Supp. 162 (knowledge of bailee "imputed"); Robertson v. Lane
(1914) 126 Minn. 78, 147 N. W. 951 (knowledge of conditional vendee
"imputed"). Inasmuch as no personal criminal penalty is imposed, the ten-
dency not to permit the innocent owner to set up lack of knowledge may be
justified as necessary to the efficacy of the statute; and is the more defensible
where, as in the instant case, the proceeds of the sale of the property are
turned over to him. Cf. also Chase v. Proprietors of Revere House (1919,
Mass.) 122 N. E. 162. Such a provision as this last is not, however, necessary
to the validity of the statute. See United States v. Brig Malek Adhei (1844,
U. S.) 2 How. 210, 233. A somewhat analogous situation is presented where
the master is made criminally responsible for the acts of his servant See
(1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 700.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PRIvILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE-CLASSIFICATION
FOR TAXATiON.-A Tennessee statute provided that any foreign construction
company with its chief office outside of the state, operating in the state, should
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pay as a privilege tax $IOO per annum and that any foreign and domestic con-
struction company having its chief office in the state should pay $25. The
defendant, whose principal office was in Alabama, failed to pay the tax and was
denied the right to sue in the state courts. Held, that this classification based
-in the location of chief offices was arbitrary and unreasonable. Chalker v.
Birmingham & N. W. Ry. (1919) 39 Sup. Ct. 366.
States may make "reasonable and natural" classifications of persons or property
for purposes of taxation. Bell's Gap Ry. v. Pennsylvania (I889) 134 U. S. 232,
IO Sup. Ct. 533; Michigan C. Ry. v. Powers (igo6) 210 U. S. 245, 26 Sup. Ct.
459. So a tax on hand laundries operated by men or over two women has been
recognized as valid. Qwong Wing v. Kirkendall (1912) 223 U. S. 59, 32 Sup.
Ct. 192. Or a graduated inheritance or income tax. See (1915) 25 YxLz LAw
JouRNAL, 427. But an exaction of a license fee from persons selling convict-
made goods was held void as arbitrary. People v. Raynes (I91O, N. Y.) 136
App. Div. 417, 12o N. Y. Supp. 1053. And so a tax upon the property of each
race, white or colored, for the support of its own separate school. Claybrook
v. City of Owensboro (1883, D. Ky.) 16 Fed. 297; Davenport v. Cloverport
(1896, D. Ky.) 72 Fed. 689. Where the classification makes separate groups of
residents and non-residents, the additional question of the "privileges and
immunities" clause comes up. Not every discrimination against non-residents is
bad under that clause. So the right of suffrage or. eligibility to office may be
conditioned on a period of residence. See People ex rel. Akin v. Loeffler
(1898) I75 Ill. 585, 51 N. E. 785. State-owned property may be reserved for
exclusive use of citizens. People v. Setunsky (i91o) 161 Mich. 624, 126 N. W.
844. As a police regulation, residents and non-residents may also be separately
classified. DeGrazier v. Stephenis (19o7) 1O Tex. I94, 1o5 S. W. 992 (liquor
dealers must be resident); State v. Richcreek (19o6) 167 Ind. 217, 77 N. E.
Io85 (licensed bankers). But in matters of taxation states may enforce no
classification which in its practical operation discriminates against non-residents
or foreign products. Ward v. Maryland (187o) 12 Wall. 418; Blake v. McClung
(i898) 172 U. S. 239, ig Sup. Ct. 165. Thus non-residents selling or offering
for sale any goods, may not be subjected to a tax higher than that levied on
permanent residents. Darnell & Son v. Memphis (1908) 208 U. S. 113, 28
Sup. Ct. 247. And a state statute which imposes a tax on persons not having
their principal place of business in the state, and engaged in selling foreign
goods, is void, unless a similar tax is levied on persons selling goods manu-
factured in the state. Walling v. Michigan (i885) 167 U. S. 446, 6 Sup. Ct. 454.
And similarly in the instant case, where the discrimination is wholly according
to the chief place of business.
CONsTTUTIIoNAL LAWv-TAxATIoN-THE "UNIT RuLE" NOT APPLICABLE TO
CAR ComPAxis.-An equipment company, incorporated in New Jersey, owned
about i2,ooo cars, which it rented to shippers and railroads. Georgia imposed
a tax on the entire property of such companies based on the ratio of track miles
in the state to the total track mileage over which the cars operated. This
resulted in fifty-seven cars, the average number constantly used in that state
per annum, which were valued at $47,ooo, being taxed as on $291,ooo. The
company refused to pay the tax, alleging the invalidity of the assessment.
Held, that the mode of appraisement was arbitrary and in violation of the "due
process" clause of the Federal Constitution. Day, J., concurred ip the result.
Pitney, Brandeis, Clarke, JJ., dissenting. Union Tank Line v. Wright (igig)
39 Sup. Ct. 276.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 8o2.
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CoNTEmPTs-CoNsTRucTvE-PuBLIc ASSAULT oN ALLEGED INFo R.-During
the progress of litigation involving the continuance of the respondent's liquor
business, the respondent went on a search for the man who had given the com-
plainant the information upon which the latter had acted. Thinking the indivi-
dual was his business neighbor, he taxed the neighbor with having given the
information, threatened to oust him from the premises (of which he, the
respondent, had the rental) and concluded by striking him. Held, that the
respondent was guilty of a contempt of court. In re Hand (I918, N. J. Ch.)
io5 At]. 594.
Having become convinced after extended examinatioii that a witness was
deliberately giving false testimony, the court placed him in custody for con-
tempt. He sued out a writ of habeas corpus. Held, that the commitment was
void for excess of power, as the punishment might not be imposed for supposed
perjury alone, without reference to circumstances giving it an obstructive effect
upon the administration of the court. Ex parte Hudgings (1919) 39 Sup. Ct.
337.
The theory of the Hand decision was that the respondent's act had a tendency
to interfere with the due administration of justice, and so came within the
classification of constructive contempts. A constructive contempt has been
defined as an act done not in the presence of the court, but at a distance, which
tends to belittle, to degrade, or to obstruct, interrupt, prevent, or embarrass
the administration of justice. See 9 Cyc. 5. Some courts refuse to find such
"obstruction" or "embarrassment" in a prevention of the presence of a person
in court, unless at the time of the interference a proceeding was actually
pending, and the person interfered with was, at that time, in some way legally
connected therewith. Thus removing a prospective witness from the county,
or inducing him to absent himself, has been held no contempt unless a proper
subpoena had issued, for that witness. Scott v. State (19o2) 1O9 Tenn. 390, 71
S. W. 824 (under statute); McConnell v. State (1874) 46 Ind. 299; Dobbs v.
State (1875) 55 Ga. 272. But if a proper subpoena has been issued, although
not served, such persuasion is a contempt. Haskett v. State (875) 51 Ind.
176; State v. Perry Moore (i9o8) 146 N. C. 653, 6i S. E. 463; cf. People v.
Jackson (913) 178 Ill. App. 121. And so a fortiori, it would seem, the
intimidation of, or assault on, a party concerned with the suit. Turk v. State
(i916) 123 Ark. 341, I85 S. W. 472 (plaintiff intimidated); Brannon v. Com-
inonwealth (9r5) 62 K y. 350, 172 S. W. 703 (witness assaulted); cf. United
States v. Barrett (1911, S. D. Ga.) 187 Fed. 378 (attorney assaulted). -The
Hand case is novel, however, in that the person assaulted was in no manner, as
yet, legally connected with the suit; and there has been some disposition to
confine constructive contempts closely within the rules already established. See
Haskett v. State, supra. One might distinguish the instant case on the ground
-that the McConnell and Dobbs cases, supra, involved mere persuasion, not
intimidation. And this would harmonize the one English decision found on
the point. Shaw v. Shaw (1862, P. D.) 6 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 477 (intimidation
of prospective witness a contempt). But the true distinction is believed to lie
in the court's interpretation in each individual case of the facts therein. The
gravamen of the offence lies in obstructing the administration of justice. What
certain actions do so obstruct it, and what do not, depends on circumstances.
And this point is admirably illustrated by the Hudgings case; the norms in
this matter being applicable to all contempts, whether direct or constructive.
CoxRmAcs-ImpossiB.rrY-Imm CoNlrroNs-EFFEc-T OF REcOMMENDATION
OF WAR LABOR BoA.--By municipal ordinances, passed in 19or, the city of
Columbus granted the plaintiff street-railway company the privilege of using its
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streets for twenty-five years, stipulating that free transfers be issued and eight
tickets be sold for twenty-five cents. The plaintiff duly accepted and established
a trolley system. In i918, a strike occurred and the National War Labor Board
increased the wages of the plaintiff's employees fifty per cent, and recommended
that the city allow an increased fare. The city refused. The company then
gave notice to the city that it regarded the franchise as cancelled and increased
the fares to five cents a single trip. A bill was filed to enjoin the city from
enforcing the terms of the ordinances. Held, that the bill must be dismissed.
Columbus Ry. Power & Light Co. v. City of Columbus (I919) 39 Sup. Ct. 349.
It is well established that a city, acting under statutory authority, may make
contracts by which privileges in the streets are granted in consideration of a
promise to render services at a fixed charge. Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Water-
works Co. (igo6) 2o6 U. S. 496, 27 Sup. Ct. 762; Cleveland v. Cleveland City Ry.
(i9o3) 194 U. S. 512, 24 Sup. Ct. 756. The city has no power to terminate such
an agreement. Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg (19o4) 202 U. S. 453, 26
Sup. Ct. 661. In the principal case, the railway held itself excused from per-
formance of its contract through supervening impossibility due to war condi-
tions. Had that been so, it could have continued operation on the basis of an
implied grant for an indefinite period, setting the old rates aside as confiscatory.
Denver Union Water Co. v. Denver (1917) 246 Ui. S. i78, 38 Sup. Ct. 278;
Detroit United Railway v. Detroit (1919) 248 U. S. 429, 39 Sup. Ct. i5I. But
the War Labor Board merely stated conditions, under which the plaintiff had
contracted to operate; and made a recommendation. It made no executive
order making performance impossible. See Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick,
Kerr & Co. [1917] 2 K. B. 1, [i918] A. C. ii9; Moore & Tierney v. Roxford
Knitting Co. (i918, N. D. N. Y.) 250 Fed. 278; see (xi918) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL,
953; (i99i) 28 ibid. 399. Nor is the present case one of temporary suspension
of the duty to perform, as in Tamplin S. S. Co. v. Anglo-Mexican etc., [i916]
2 A. C. 397. To be sure, the old rule holding contractors to the letter of their
agreements has been somewhat relaxed, and in exceptional cases courts have
given relief from dangers and hardships through the medium of constructive
conditions. Chicago, etc. Ry. v. Hoyt (1893) 149 U. S. i, 13 Sup. Ct. 779;
Kronprinzessin Cecilie (1917) 244 U. S, 12, 37 Sup. Ct. 490, (1917) 27 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 247, 791. But the court in the instant case weighed the fact
that no loss had been shown over the full period of operation, and decided that
this was not a case in which such a condition should be implied. The case thus
falls under the general rule that unforeseen difficulties do not excuse perform-
ance.
CONTRACTs-THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY-MATERIALMEN AND BUILDER's BoND;-
The defendant surety company bound itself to the owner of a building, as
obligee, to see that the building contractor should perform all of his duties to
the owner, one of these duties being that he should pay all claims for labor
and material. It was expressly provided in the bond that the surety was to
be notified of any act on the part of the principal that might involve loss to the
surety, immediately upon knowledge of such an act coming to the owner or his
supervising architect. No notice of this sort was ever given. The materialman,
being unpaid, brought suit against the surety company on the bond. Held, that
the materialman might maintain suit. Forburger Stone Co. v. Lion Bonding &
Surety Co. (i919, Neb.) i7O N. W. 897.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 798.
DAMAGES--"DUTY" To MITIGATE-REcovERY OF EXPENSES OF DENIAL IN AcTiox
FOR LmEL.-The. defendant published a libel concerning the plaintiff, which the
828 YALE LAW JOURNAL
plaintiff denied by advertisement in newspapers. The plaintiff sought to recover
the costs of such advertisements as an item of damage. The defendant
moved to strike the item from the complaint. Held, that the plaintiff could
recover the expense of his denials. Den Norske Americkalinje Actiesselskabet
v. Sun Printing and Publishing Association (1919, N. Y.) 122 N. E. 463.
Opinions and text books abound with the assertion that an injured plaintiff is
under a "duty" to mitigate his damages. 13 Cyc. 71, 73; Sutherland, Damages,
311. This "duty" is proclaimed in the case of injury to the person. Flint v.
Connecticut Hassam Paving Co. (1918) 92 Conn. 576, 1O3 At. 84o (hiring
physician). Likewise in breach of contract Feeney & Bremer Co. v. Stone
(1918) 89 Or. 36o, 171 Pac. 569. He whose property has been negligently injured
is said to be under this "duty," although where the injury is intentional, the devo-
tion of the common law to the protection of property releases the plaintiff from
his so-called obligation. Borden et al. v. Carolina Power, etc. Co. (1917) 174 N.
C. 72, 93 S. E. 442; City of Jackson v. Wilson (1916) 146 Ga. 250, 91 S. E. 63.
If this relation of the plaintiff to the defendant were a duty in the strict, legal
sense, it would follow that if he failed to make a reasonable attempt to mitigate,
he would himself be subject to an action for damages. But such is not the con-
sequence. If he fails to mitigate his damages, he is only under a legal disability
to collect from the defendant for the items which might reasonably have been
prevented. Furthermore, but entirely separate and distinct, the plaintiff has a
legal power, by attempting to mitigate, to create in the defendant a duty to pay
the costs of his reasonable attempts. The confounding of legal duty with legal
disability, and a failure to discern this legal power, led the court in the principal
case over a very circuitous route, to reach a near goal. They did not want to
hold that the plaintiff was under a "duty" to publish denials, in the sense that
if he had failed to publish them, he could not have recovered full damages for
his injury. But they did want the plaintiff, having published the denials, to
recover the expense of such publication. They cut the knot with the alarming
statement that this is one of the few instances where "duty" and "right" are
not correlative. The correct solution of the problem seems to be that a libeled
plaintiff is like one whose realty has been intentionally injured, in that he does
not labor under a disability to collect damages if he fails to publish denials,
but that he nevertheless does possess the entirely separate and distinct power,
by publishing such denials, to impose a duty upon the defendant to pay the
expenses so incurred. Perhaps the rule as to libel, however, should not be
treated as exceptional. In no case does the law disable a plaintiff on account of
a failure to mitigate, where the means are very expensive and the results
speculative. American Smelting and Refining Co. v. Riverside Dairy and Stock
Farm (1916, C. C. A. 8th) 236 Fed. 51o; Youmans v. City of Hendersonville
(x918) 175 N. C. 574, 96 -S. E. 45; Louisville and Nashville R. R. v. Kerrick
(1917) 178 Ky. 486, 199 S. W. 44. And certainly the effect of an expensive
published assertion of innocence is not easy to calculate. On the other hand,
if a libeled plaintiff wishes to use reasonable means to deny his guilt, it would
seem just to compel the defendant to foot the bill even though the effectiveness
of the effort is in doubt. Peck v. Chicago Railways (915) 270 Ili. 34, 110
N. E. 414.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-ABANDONMENT-WIF 'S IMMUNITY FROM ALIENATION BY
HuSBAND.-A poor debtor abandoned his wife without fault on her part; he
later attempted to sell to his father certain chattels in the possession of the wife.
Statutes exempted the property left by an absconding debtor in the hands of his
wife from execution by his creditors, and allowed the wife as head of the
family to "manage, sell and incumber his property." The father sued on the
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bill of sale. Held, that the husband had no power to alienate this property.
Holdorf v. Holdorf (I919, Iowa) I71 N. W. 42.
When a husband has failed to perform his duty to support his wife, she has
the power to pledge his credit for necessaries. See L. R. A. i9i7A 958 note.
In such a case the wife would seem of course to have the privilege, as against
her husband, of using this property: so crops grown on the homestead, or the
proceeds thereof. For she has the power and privilege of turning such property
into money by sale. Hoskins v. Fayetteville Grocery Co. (i9o6) '79 Ark. 399,
96 S. W. 195; Rawson and Rice v. Spangler (1883) 62 Ia. 59, 17 N. W. 173.
And, often, of conducting the business of her husband, and of making contracts
reasonably necessary for its management, as under the statute in the principal
case. Furthermore, it seems that the deserted wife has an immunity in the
homestead, against creditors of the husband. 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 114. And,
as a general rule, in the crops grown and growing thereon. See 32 ibid. 577,
note. And under statutes granting exemption to the property of a poor debtor,
the immunity both as to realty and personalty is extended to the debtor's wife,
if wrongfully deserted. Bank of Liberal v. Redlinger (19o2) 95 Mo. App. 279,
68 S. W. 1073; Mitchell v. Joyce (1886) 69 Ia. 121, 28 N. W. 473. (As to what
is necessary to constitute desertion and abandonment, see (1914) 24 YAI.E LAW
JOURNAL, 578.) So the wife, as "head of the family" of an absconding debtor,
has the right to recover chattels wrongfully attached. Baun v. Turner (19o3)
25 Ky. L. Rep. 600, 76 S. W. 129. And it seems to be likewise settled that she
has an immunity from alienation of a homestead by the husband's sole act. See
Murphy v. Renner (19o6) 99 Minn. 348, iog N. W. 593, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 564,
and note. The principal case makes a logical development in extending this last
immunity to chattels of her husband left in her hands, and denying him, after
desertion, the power of alienating them. The two dissenting judges admit the
justice of the majority decision, but contend that the court has no power to
construe the statutes so liberally as to practically produce legislation by the
court.
INJUNCTIONS-INJuNCTlON PENDENTE LITE-RETRAINING ENFORCEMENT OF
INCREASED RATEs-The Attorney General and the railway commission on
behalf of South Dakota petitioned to permanently restrain the defendant express
company from making effective a schedule of increased intra-state rates, and to
secure an injunction pendente lite. It was claimed, that the President and the
administrative officers acting for him had exceeded their authority under the
Federal -Control Acts of August 26, 1916, and March 21, 1918, in putting into
effect the increased rates. Held, that an injunction pendente lite should be
issued; since the suit might drag for years, and the smallness of the sums and
the number and variety of the persons involved would make later restitution
practically impossible should the increase in rates be found unwarranted.
State ex rel. Caldwell v. American Ry. Express Co. (1919, S. D.) 17o N. W. 570.
Pending determination of such an action there are four possible solutions of
the question of injunction pendente lite. (i) To issue, or (2) to deny an
injunction, without more. Either course lays the court open to the danger of
keeping rates in force over a considerable period which subsequently prove to
have been unjust. And no recovery can be had by either party of what he has
suffered by being forced to contract in accordance with the temporary order.
See (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 5o4 This situation can be remedied by (3)
issuing or (4) denying the injunction, but requiring shippers or carrier respec-
tively to furnish bond for payment or refund respectively of the amount of
increase, according to the later decision as to the propriety of the increase.
The company may be required to pay into court monthly all charges in excess
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of those fixed by the commission. Louirville & N. R. R. v. Kentucky R. R.
Com. (1914, E. D. Ky.) 214 Fed. 465. Or be compelled to issue to each person
purchasing a ticket at the higher rate a coupon for eventual redemption.
Bellamy v. Missouri & N. A. R. R. (I9x4, C. C. A. 8th) 215 Fed. 18; see also
Taylor-Williams Coal Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (I918, Ohio) i19 N. E. 459.
In the instant case, the .njunction might be denied; the new rates are prima
facie necessary for the successful operation of a public utility for the prosecu-
tion of the war. And increased rates, where necessary to operation, have been
allowed to remain in force pending decision. Public Utilities Com. v. Rhode
Island Co. (1918, R. I.) lO4 At. 69o. It is submitted that the instant decision
takes to an unwise, somewhat arbitrary, and, it may prove, very unjust means
to prevent an evil against which ample protection could be had in the way
suggested. A novel jurisdictional complication of these cases is introduced
by a recent Massachusetts decision, Public Service Com. v. New England Tel.
Co. (1919, Mass.) 122 N. E. 566. There a petition by the commission, to enforce
an order suspending the taking effect of increased intra-state rates, was dis-
missed on the ground that the United States "was vitally interested and alone
concerned in the toll rates," was a necessary party, could not be impleaded
without its consent, and had not consented. Cf. (igig) 28 YALE LAw JouRNAL,
714; ibid. i99; and see further, on the effect of reversal of an injunction decis-
ion, ibid. 6oo.
INsuRANcE-LIF PoLIcY-ExEcuTioN oF INsupn-The plaintiff held an insur-
ance policy issued by the defendant on the life of one Weil. The policy con-
tained a clause that "if this policy matures after the expiration of two years,
the payment of the same shall not be disputed." Subseqtient to the expiration
of two years, Weil was executed for murder. Held, that the plaintiff could
recover the amount of the policy. Weil v. Travelers' Insurance Co. (1918, Ala.)
8o So. 348.
Recovery was denied in the first case on this point, which was decided at a
time when execution for crime worked a forfeiture of estate and corruption of
blood. Amicable Society v. Bolland (183o, Eng. Ch.) 4 Bligh's N. R. i94. This
holding has been followed by the Supreme Court, on the ground of public
policy. Burt v. Union Central Life Insurance Co. (19o2) 187 U. S. 362, 23
Sup. Ct. 139; Northwestern Mutual'Life Insurance Co. v. McCue (1911) 223
U. S. 234, 32 Sup. Ct. 22o. The objections to this rule are set forth in (I912)
22 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 158, 292. It is also weakened by the analogous cases
of suicide which allow recovery. See Campbell v. Supreme Conclave Order
Heptasophs (igoi, Ct. Err.) 66 N. J. L. 274, 278-281, 49 Atl. 550, 551-552.
Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that there should be no recovery
in such cases, where the policy contains no stipulation as to these events, merely
because an express insurance of suicide or execution would be void. See (io9)
7 MicH. L. REv. 673-675. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Illinois refused to
follow the above authorities because forfeiture was no longer affected by
execution. Collins v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. (19o7) 232 Ill. 37, 83 N. E. 542.
Nevertheless, the majority doctrine has recently been followed and recovery
denied, in the teeth of an incontestability clause in the policy. Scarborough v.
American Insurance Co. (ii6) 171 N. C. 353, 88 S. E. 482; American National
Insurance Co. v. Munson (1918, Tex.) 202 S. W. 987. The Alabama court in
the principal case, taking the opposite view, followed one of their recent
decisions which held that the incontestability clause of a policy should bar all
defenses not expressly reserved. Life Insurance Co. v. Lovejoy (1918, Ala.)
78 So. 299. This view seems preferable, both because of the above objections to
the majority doctrine and because policies are to be construed in favor of the
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insured. See 14 R. C. L. 926 and cases cited in note 9. It is doubtful, however,
whether Alabama would adopt the minority holding should a policy have no
clause of incontestability.
INTERSTATE COmmERCE-TELEGRAmS BETWEEN POINTS WITHIN A STATE PASS-
ING THROUGH ANOTHER STATE.-The plaintiff delivered to the defendant at
Bassett, Va., a message to be transmitted to Martinsvile, Va. The message was
sent by a wire which passed Martinsville, but is not designed for direct use there,
to a point in North Carolina, whence it was relayed back to Martinsville. An
error was made in the transmission, and this action was brought to recover
the statutory penalty given by a Virginia statute. Held, that the message con-
stituted interstate commerce and was beyond the control of the state. Western
Union Tel. v. Bowles (i919, Va.) 98 S. E. 645.
Since the amendment of June 18, i9po (36 Stat. L. 539) to the Commerce
Act of 1887, it has generally been held, as in the principal case, that state
statutes are inapplicable to telegrams between points within a state which pass
through another state. Bateman v. Western Union (1917) 174 N. C. 97, 97
S. E. 467, L. IL A. 19i8A 803, and see note, ibid. 805. The grounds given are
that such messages constitute interstate commerce and the federal statute covers
the whole subject. Contra, Western Union Tel. Co. v. Sharp (I915) 121 Ark.
135, 180 S. W. 504 (not interstate commerce); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Boegli
(1917, Ind.) 115 N. E. 773 (act of Congress does not cover the whole field).
The majority view seems the sounder, and the more likely to be upheld when
the question comes before the Supreme Court. The esserice of interstate com-
merce is the crossing of the state border; once it is crossed, whether to be
recrossed again or not, the transaction cannot be said to be wholly within the
state. There has been some indication of a disposition to limit the rule to
cases where the message was not given its interstate routing solely in order
to avoid the state statute. Cf. Bateman v. Western Union, supra; and the
principal case. But it is not believed that such a limitation would be upheld.
Cf. Western Union v. Mahone (917) i2o Va. 422,9i S. E. 157.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-DEFAMATORY TELEGRAM-PuNITIVE DAMAGES FOR MALIcE
oF AGENT IN TRANsMrNG.-The defendant's agent maliciously, accepted and
forwarded a message libelous on its face, concerning the plaintiff. In an action
by the plaintiff, claiming punitive damages, the defendant contended that the
agent acted beyond the scope of his authority. Held, that the corporation was
liable in punitive damages. Paton v. Great Northwestern Telegraph Co. (igig,
Minn.) io7 N. W. 51i.
Telegraph companies are privileged to refuse messages presented when the
acceptance and transmission of the message would subject the companies to
civil liability. Western Union v'. Lillard (i9o8) 86 Ark 208, 110 S. W. 1035;
Gray v. Western Union (I89I) 87 Ga. 350, 13 S. E. 562. Such a privilege exists
therefore where the message is clearly libelous on its face. Peterson v. Western
Union (i899) 75 Minn. 368, 77 N. W. 9851 Stockman v. Western Union (igoo)
io Kan. App. 58o, 63 Pac. 658; Western Union v. Cashman (i9o6, C. C. A. 5th)
149 Fed. 367. These cases also hold that in the absence of gross negligence or
malice, only compensatory damages may be recovered. Where, however, malice
in fact is shown on the part of an agent of the company, the damages may be
exemplary. A corporation is not usually liable for acts of its officers in their
own private transaqtions. See (1911) 21 YArE LAw JoURNAL, 517. Yet it
may be, if the frauds or other wrongs committed by the agent fall within the
class of acts in which he usually represents the corporation, although done in
the particular instance for his personal benefit. See Q(o7) 17 ibid. 56. So in
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this country with the issuance of false stock certificates. New York, N. H. &
H. R. R. v. Schuyler (1865) 34 N. Y. 30; Fifth Ave. Bk. v. 42nd Street and
Grand Street Ferry Co. (1893) 137 N. Y. 231, 33 N. E. 378. Or of false bills
of lading. Uniform Bills of Lading Act, sec. 23; Williston, Sales, sec. 419;
Bank of Batavia v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R. (1887) io6 N. Y. 196; (igo7)
17 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 400; contra, Grant v. Norway (1851) io C. B. 665;
National Bank of Commerce v. Chicago, B. & N. R. (i8go) 44 Minn. 2z4, 46
N. W. 342, 56o. And to this rule defamation makes no exception; a corpora-
tion may be liable even for slander by its agents. See (1919) 28 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 702. On the measure of punitive damages therefor, see (1918) 27 ibid.
7oi. Nor is the imposition of punitive damages, for an agent's act, without
support in the books. They are in the nature of a private penalty; but an
agent's unauthorized act may even subject the corporation to a criminal penalty,
of fine or forfeiture. See (1919) 28 ibid. 700; cf. also supra, sub. tit. CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAw-DUE PRocEss. And it may be that a stricter rule should be
applied to public service than to private corporations. Cf. Cohen v. Dry Dock
& C. R. R. (1877) 69 N. Y. 17o.
QUASI-CONTRACTS-VOLUNTARY PERFORMANCE OF ANOTHER'S STATUTORY
DUTY.-Statutes provided that schoolboards should arrange transportation to
and from schools for children who lived beyond a certain distance. The plain-
tiff resided beyond this distance, but no transportation had been provided. He
sued for the value of his services in daily conveying his, children to school.
Held, that he could recover. Eastgate v. Osayo School District (I919, N. D.)
171 N. W. 96.
It has seemed well settled that a plaintiff who has done that which is another's
statutory duty cannot recover from the latter the value of the services rendered,
if he has not first, without avail, demanded performance of the duty by the
defendant Hamilton County v. Meyers (1888) 23 Neb. 718, 37 N. W. 623
(medical aid to pauper); Patrick v. Town of Baldwin (igoi) lO9 Wis. 342,
85 N. W. 274 (same). And it has been held that even though notice was given
no recovery could be had. Macclesfield Corporation v. Great Central Ry.
(C. A.) [1911] 2 K. B. 528 (repairs on bridge). But the better authority allows
recovery in that case. Trustees of Cincinnati v. Ogden (1831) 5 Ohio, 23
(support of pauper); Randolph v. Town of Greenwood (i9o5) 12 Ill. App.
231 (same). And an emergency which makes the giving of notice imprac-
ticable, dispenses therewith. County of Madison v. Haskill (1895) 63 Ill. App.
657 (medical services to pauper); Robbins v. Town of Homer (igo5) 95 Minn.
201, 1o3 N. W. iO23 (same). In the principal case there was no emergency and
no notice seems to have been given the school board. The decision, it is sub-
mitted, is a result of the combination of a number of circumstances tending
toward recovery, no one of which alone would seem to justify it A statute
made education compulsory; statutes made it the mandatory duty of the board
to apprise itself of what children were entitled to transportation, and to provide
the same; there appears to have been in fact no transportation which the plain-
tiff's children might have used, even at some inconvenience; the statutes author-
ized compensation, where agreed, in lieu of transportation, and even set out a
schedule of rates; and the acts-as promoting public education-were of benefit
to the community, and were such as the plaintiff was under a moral duty to
perform. The absence of other facilities distinguishes the case from those
denying recovery for aid to paupers; for in those cases poor-houses were avail-
able. See Hamilton County v. Meyers and Patrick v. Town of Baldwin, supra.
And it is suggested that where the combination exists, of benefit to the com-
munity and strong moral duty in the plaintiff, it should and will incline the
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courts to allow recovery more readily. Hence the principal case seems sound in
result. It may be doubted, however, whether the English courts would not on
the same facts deny recoverk', on the ground that a volunteer, even though not
an officious intermeddler, cannot recover. See Macclesfield Corporation v. Great
Central Ry., supra.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-VAccniAn Oi-ExcLusIoN Rom SCHOOL.-The com-
piled laws of North Dakota provide that: it shall be the duty of* principals,
teachers, parents, etc., to refuse to permit any child having any contagious or
infectious disease, including smallpox, to attend a public or private school;
each parent or guardian shall cause any minor in his care to be vaccinated; any
person not complying with this provision shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and
punishable by a fine; it shall be the duty of the state board of health to make
and enforce all needful rules and regulations for the prevention and cure, and
to prevent the spread of any contagious, infectious or malarial diseases among
persons and domestic animals; that all school boards shall co6perate with the
state board of health. The state board of health promulgated an order requiring
every child to present satisfactory evidence of vaccination before being admitted
to school. The defendant, a local school board, adopted the order of the state
board of health and excluded the plaintiff, a minor, from school for non-
compliance therewith. There was no epidemic of smallpox in the neighborhood
and no apprehension of such. A further statute made the attendance of children
of the age of the plaintiff compulsory, and penalized the parents for failure to
comply with same. The plaintiff applied for a writ of mandamus to compel the
board to admit him to school. Held, (Cole, J., dissenting) that the writ should
be granted. Rhea v. Board of Education, etc. (xpi, N. D.) I7i N. W. 1o3.
The court reasoned that the failure to include non-vaccination in the statute
which made it the duty of teachers, etc., to refuse admission to those children
having any contagious or infectious disease, etc., indicated that the claimed
power was not intended to be granted either to the state board of health or the
local board of education, on the ground that expressio unius est exclusio alterius;
that a board of health which possesses merely general powers for the pre-
vention and spread of contagious diseases, cannot, in the absence of reasonable
apprehension of danger, promulgate and enforce rules which seriously cut into
the individual's liberty and whose preventive efficacy is doubtful to the court.
The power of the legislature by express provision to authorize administrative
boards to require vaccination and penalize non-compliance has.been acknowl-
edged in nearly every state. Herbert v. School Board (I9I6) 197 Ala. 617, 73
So. 321; Blue v. Beach (igoo) 155 Ind. 12, 56 N. E. 89; State v. Hay (igoo)
126 N. C. 999, 35 S. E. 459; Morris v. City of Columbus (1897) io2 Ga. 792,
3o S. E. 85o. Nor is it necessary for such boards, possessing an express power,
to wait until a threatened epidemic before prohibiting school attendance of
children not complying with their order. State ex rel. Milhoof v. Board of
Education (I9o7) 76 Oh. St. 297, 8i N. E. 568; Re Rebenack (i895) 62 Mo.
App. 8; cf. Bissel v. Davison (1894) 65 Conn. 183, 32 Atl. 348. It has been
denied, however, that a board possessing express power only to enforce regula-
tions "necessary to safeguard the public health," and to "prevent the spread
of disease," has the power to exclude children when there is no epidemic appre-
hended. Jenkins v. Board of Health (1908) 234 Ill. 422, 84 N. E. io46, 17
L. R. A. (N. S.) 709; Potts v Breen (1897) 67 Ill. 67, 47 N. E. 8i; Adams v.
Burdge (897) 95 Wis. 390, 70 N. W. 347; cf. State ex rel. Cox v. Board of
Education (1900) 21 Utah, 4oI, 6o Pac. ioi3. Whether such general power of the
board includes the specific power to require vaccination, etc., in the absence of
an epidemic, is obviously in any given case a question of legislative intent. In
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the instant case the statutes requiring all children to be vaccinated, and to
attend school, are in pari materia with the imposition of duty on teachers, etc.,
to refuse admission to schools of children suffering from disease or living in
homes, etc., and with the statute giving the board of health general power to make
all regulations needful for the public health. The intent of the legislature -would
seem to be strongly evidenced by the statute which required all children to be
vaccinated and penalized the parents for the non-compliance. This interpreta-
tion does not seem to be materially weakened by the application to the statute
making it the duty of teachers to exclude in certain cases of the maxim expressio
unius, etc. It has been objected to such an interpretation, however, that when
a parent was subject to a statute which required the vaccination of children
and penalized him for non-compliance, and when he was also subject to a
penalty for neglect to send his child to school, the result would by implication
give the board a power to which an express grant of the legislature is. neces-
sary; namely, to enforce vaccination. Cf. Matthews v. Board of Education
(igoi) 127 Mich. 530, 86 N. W. 1o36. The majority of the court in the
principal case seem to have been influenced by this reasoning. "It is not
particularly the function of the board of health to compel compliance with
this statute. The board is not the public prosecutor." But the objection
seems hardly sound, for it has been held under facts similar to those of
this case that a parent acquires a privilege of not complying with the com-
pulsory education act. State ex rel. O'Bannon v. Cole (i9o9) 22o Mo. 697, 119
S. W. 424; Commonwealth v. Smith (igoo) 9 Pa. Dist. 625. It should be
observed that the Supreme Court of North Dakota seems to judge for itself
both whether the conditions demanded preventative measures and whether a
requirement of vaccination was such a measure, which is contrary to the general
rule of leaving the board a wide discretion in such matters and of taking judicial
notice of the teachings and belief of the majority of medical experts on the
value of vaccination. For similar distinction between general and express
powers of boards, as to compulsory physical examination, see (igig) 28 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 703.
